Após a agência de classificação de risco Standard & Poors anunciar a perda do grau de investimento para a economia brasileira, o ministro da Fazenda disse que o país não está à beira de uma crise, em entrevista a Roberto Paiva, da TV Globo, em São Paulo.
"[O Brasil] é um país que não está à beira de uma crise. É um país está se acertando para um ambiente mundial muito diferente, então quanto mais rápido a gente se acertar menos custo vai ter essa transição e a gente vai poder voltar a crescer nesse ambiente", disse Joaquim Levy.
Em comunicado, a agência S&P chama a atenção para a deterioração fiscal e a falta de coesão da equipe ministerial, como causas da decisão de rebaixar a nota.
Segundo o ministro, o rebaixamento do país tem impacto em diversos aspectos da economia. "E indicaa importância da gente continuar o trabalho da recuperação fiscal como uma das principais alavancas para a retomada do crescimento", explicou.
Levy disse que o esforço fiscal para o Orçamento de 2016 é um caminho 'extremamente importante' para construção das políticas que podem fazer o país voltar a crescer e gerar empregos.
Segundo a S&P, a proposta do Orçamento para 2016 com um déficit R$ 30,5 bilhões, ou o equivalente a 0,3% do PIB em vez dos 0,7% previstos em julho, "reflete um desacordo com a composição e magnifude das medidas necessárias para reequilibrar as contas públicas".
A peça orçamentária de 2016 foi enviada ao Congresso, pela primeira vez na história, com a previsão de déficit (despesas maiores do que receitas). A meta fiscal para o governo é de um déficit de R$ 30,5 bilhões no ano que vem, o equivalente a 0,5% do PIB. Para todo o setor público (envolvendo estados, municípios e empresas estatais), a meta é de um resultado negativo de R$ 21,1 bilhões, ou 0,34% do PIB, em 2016.
Nas últimas semanas, o governo tem anunciado a intenção de encontrar novas formas de receita para equilibrar o Orçamento vem, inclusive sendo defendida em público pela presidente Dilma Rousseff como forma de evitar o déficit no Orçamento de 2016. Dilma avaliou recentemente o governo cortou "tudo que poderia ser cortado", nas palavras de Dilma.
Entre as ideias, surgiu a possibilidade de retomada da CPMF e, nesta semana, de aumento do Imposto de Renda. Os parlamentares, porém, não têm demonstrado apoio a eventuais aumentos de tributos e têm defendido um corte maior de gastos. Mesmo com déficit, a peça orçamentária de 2016 embute aumento de despesas.
No mercado financeiro, a nota de um país funciona como um "certificado de segurança" que as agências de classificação dão a países que elas consideram com baixo risco de calotes a investidores.
Contas públicas
As contas de todo o setor público (governo, estados, municípios e empresas estatais) registraram em 2014 o primeiro déficit primário (receitas menos despesas, sem contar juros) da história em 2014. No ano passado, o déficit primário foi de R$ 32,53 bilhões, ou 0,63% do PIB, em todo ano passado.
Em 2015, as contas públicas registraram, de janeiro a julho, o pior resultado da série histórica, que começa em 2001, para este período. Em 12 meses até julho, houve um déficit primário de R$ 50,99 bilhões, ou 0,89% do PIB, também o pior resultado da série histórica para este indicador.
Quando se incorporam os juros da dívida pública na conta, no conceito conhecido no mercado como resultado "nominal", houve déficit de R$ 502 bilhões em 12 meses até julho, o equivalente a expressivos 8,81% do PIB. Trata-se, também, do pior resultado da história. Esse número é acompanhado com atenção pelas agências de classificação de risco na determinação da nota dos países.
Ajuste fiscal
Desde o início do ano, em uma tentativa de melhorar os resultados das contas públicas, foram aumentados tributos sobre empréstimos, carros, cosméticos, cerveja, vinhos, destilados, bancos, receitas financeiras das empresas, taxas de fiscalização de serviços públicos, gasolina e exportações de manufaturados, entre outros.
Também foram promovidas limitações de benefícios sociais, como seguro-desemprego, auxílio-doença, abono salarial e pensão por morte, além de aumento da tributação sobre a folha de pagamentos. Todas estas medidas já passaram pelo crivo do Congresso Nacional.
Brasil conquistou grau de investimento em 2008
A S&P é a primeira agência entre as maiores a tirar o grau de investimento do Brasil. Na Moody´s, o país está no último degrau, antes do grau especulativo. Na Fitch, o Brasil segue dois degraus acima.
O Brasil conquistou o grau de investimento pelas agências internacionais Fitch Ratings e Standard & Poor’s em 2008. Em 2009, conquistou a classificação pela Moody’s.
Selo de bom pagador
O grau de investimento é um selo de qualidade que assegura aos investidores um menor risco de calotes. A partir da nota de risco que determinado país recebeu, os investidores podem avaliar se a possibilidade de ganhos (por exemplo, com juros maiores) compensa o risco de perder o capital investido com a instabilidade econômica local.
Alguns fundos de pensão internacionais, de países da Europa ou os Estados Unidos, por exemplo, seguem a regra de que só se pode investir em títulos de países que estão classificados com grau de investimento por agências internacionais. Por isso, essa "nota" permite que o país receba recursos de investidores interessados em aplicar seu dinheiro naquele local.
A perda do grau de investimento na S&P significa também um revés para a equipe econômica liderada pelo ministro da Fazenda, Joaquim Levy, que vem trabalhando para tentar melhorar o perfil das contas públicas visando não só o equilíbrio fiscal como também o risco de perda do chamado "grau de investimento".
Previsão para a economia
No comunicado, a agência diz esperar que o déficit fiscal do país aumente para uma média de 8% do PIB em 2015 e 2016 antes de cair para 5,9% em 2017, contra 6,1% em 2014. Para a S&P, a dívida pública do país (sem contar as reservas internacionais), deve subir para 53% do PIB este ano e para 59% no próximo ano, de47% em 2014. "Também esperamos que a receita com os juros suba para acima de 20% este ano e no próximo, dos 15% no ano passado", conclui.
Íntegra do comunicado da S&P, em inglês
Brazil Foreign Currency Ratings Lowered To 'BB+/B'; Outlook Is Negative
Overview
The political challenges Brazil faces have continued to mount, weighing on the government's ability and willingness to submit a 2016 budget to Congress consistent with the significant policy correction signaled during the first part of President Dilma Rousseff's second term. The government's 2016 budget proposal envisions yet another change to the primary fiscal target less than six weeks after the previous downward revision, which would mean three consecutive years of a primary deficit and net general debt continuing to rise if subsequent revenue or expenditure measures are not taken. We are lowering the long-term foreign and local currency sovereign ratings on Brazil to 'BB+' and 'BBB-', respectively. The negative outlook reflects what we believe is a greater than one–in–three likelihood of a further downgrade due to a further deterioration of Brazil's fiscal position, potential key policy reversals given the fluid political dynamics, including a further lack of cohesion within the president's cabinet, or due to greater economic turmoil than we currently expect.
Rating Action
On Sept. 9, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the Federative Republic of Brazil to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', and the long-term local currency sovereign credit rating to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'. The outlook is negative. We also lowered the short-term foreign currency rating to 'B' from 'A-3' and the short-term local currency rating to 'A-3' from 'A-2'. We also lowered the transfer and convertibility assessment to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'. We affirmed the 'brAAA' national-scale rating and revised the outlook on this rating to negative.
Rationale
We believe Brazil's credit profile has weakened further since July 28, when we revised the outlook on Brazil to negative. At that time, we signaled increased execution risks to the corrective policy changes already underway, mainly stemming from fluid political dynamics in Congress associated with spillover effects from investigations of corruption at state-owned energy company Petrobras. We now perceive less conviction within the president's cabinet on
fiscal policy. Brazil's 2016 budget proposal tabled on Aug. 31 incorporated yet another revision to the government's fiscal targets in a short period of time. The proposed budget is based on a primary deficit of 0.3% of GDP, rather than the previously revised 0.7% of GDP surplus target that was announced in July. This change reflects internal disagreement about the composition and magnitude of measures needed to redress the slippage in public finances. Without an unexpected overperformance, the proposed fiscal target in the budget would yield three consecutive years of primary (non-interest) fiscal deficits and a continual rise of net general government debt. While the Ministry of Finance is working on putting forward various measures to regain the 0.7% of GDP initial surplus target, they will need to be negotiated
piecemeal with Congress. More importantly, the series of events leading to the budget proposal suggests to us diminished cohesion within President Rousseff's cabinet and contributes to our assessment of a weaker credit profile. Given the magnitude of the challenges on the political, economic, and fiscal fronts facing Brazil, we had assumed unwavering cabinet support in order to maximize the executive's negotiating power with Congress.
We now expect the general government deficit to rise to an average of 8% of GDP in 2015 and 2016 before declining to 5.9% in 2017, versus 6.1% in 2014. We do not expect a primary fiscal surplus in 2015 or 2016. A high (and slow-to-decline) interest burden (given higher interest rates and the impact of the weaker Brazilian real on outstanding foreign exchange swaps) contributes to the large deficit. The slightly larger change in general government debt to GDP vis-à-vis the headline deficit incorporates some fluctuations in central bank repo operations and an end to off-budget (below-the-line) spending.
We expect general government debt, net of liquid assets (not including international reserves), to rise to 53% of GDP this year and to 59% next year from 47% in 2014. We also expect interest to revenues to remain above 20% this year and next, from 15% last year, and to moderate slowly given the depreciation of the Brazilian real and higher interest rates. We assess contingent liabilities from the financial sector and all Brazilian NFPEs (nonfinancial public enterprises, including Petrobras) as "limited," as our criteria define the term.
Our rating on Brazil reflects our view of its established political institutions and broad commitment to policies that maintain economic stability–albeit somewhat weaker than before. We find that the ongoing investigations of corruption allegations against high-profile individuals and companies–in both the private and public sectors and across political parties–have led to increased near-term political uncertainty.
These independent investigations and subsequent prosecutions of corrupt practices are a testament to the institutional framework in Brazil, which contrasts with that of other emerging economies. At the same time, they have weakened near-term political cohesion and coalition dynamics. Stressed coalition dynamics between the Workers' Party and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party augur poorly for approval of needed fiscal adjustment measures, even with a relaxed fiscal target, in our view. This is against a backdrop of low approval ratings for President Rousseff and her government, which have declined to less than 10%, and the possibility that the president may be impeached (although this outcome is not our base case).
Indeed, we continue to believe that economic weakness exacerbates execution risk. We now expect the contraction in real GDP to be deeper and longer, with another revision to our growth outlook. Our projections estimate a contraction of about 2.5% this year followed by another 0.5% contraction in 2016, before returning to modest growth in 2017.
With per capita GDP of about US$8,900, Brazil's growth prospects are, in our opinion, below that of other countries at a similar stage of development.
Notwithstanding the more recent hesitation on the magnitude of the needed fiscal adjustment, the government has adopted other policies to lay the foundation for growth over the medium term. The government is reducing off-budget spending and removing various economic distortions, including artificially suppressed administered prices. To contain inflation and inflation expectations, the central bank embarked on another tightening cycle.
It had also moderated intervention in the foreign exchange market (through some curtailment of the offer of U.S. dollars via its real-denominated foreign exchange swap program), facilitating depreciation of the real, though it has increased intervention recently. The government has also placed renewed emphasis on private-sector participation in infrastructure projects. We do not see, however, that these positive steps have turned around business sentiment.
In our observations, policy decisions have damaged business sentiment in recent years, and the uncertainties and spillover effects associated with the corruption investigations continue to hold sentiment back. It now appears that Brazil is further away from a shift to positive growth until some of the political uncertainties settle.
We expect Brazil's external vulnerability will rise somewhat over the next several years. We don't expect foreign direct investment (FDI) to fully cover Brazil's current account deficit at about 4% of GDP in 2015-2017. We expect narrow net external debt to average of 36% of current account receipts from 2015-2017. Our estimates of external debt are calculated on a residency basis. They include nonresident holdings of locally issued real-denominated government debt estimated at about US$153 billion (55% of current account receipts) in 2014. These holdings have risen in reais terms so far this year (though were down on a monthly basis in July); however, given currency depreciation, we expect them to be lower in 2015 and 2016 in U.S. dollar terms. Our external debt data, however, do not include debt of approximately 30% of current account receipts raised offshore by Petrobras and transferred.
in the form of FDI to the head office. That said, despite the wider current account deficit, Brazil has low external financing needs compared with its current account receipts and its high level of international reserves compared with some of its peers.
The local currency rating on Brazil is higher than the foreign currency rating, reflecting our view of the credibility of its monetary policy, its floating exchange-rate regime, and the depth of its capital markets. In accordance with our criteria, we lowered the local currency rating two notches to narrow the gap between the two ratings because of Brazil's fiscal performance.
Outlook
The negative outlook reflects our view that there is a greater than one–in–three likelihood that we could lower our ratings on Brazil again. We anticiapte that within the next year a downgrade could stem in particular from a further deterioration of Brazil's fiscal position, or from potential keypolicy reversals given the fluid political dynamics, including a further lack of cohesion within the cabinet. A downgrade could also result from greater economic turmoil than we currently expect either due to governability issues or the weakened external environment.
We could revise the outlook to stable if Brazil's political uncertainties and conditions for consistent policy execution were to improve across branches of government to staunch fiscal deterioration and stregthen GDP growth prospects.
We expect that these improvements would support a quicker turnaround and could help Brazil exit from the current recession, facilitating improved fiscal performance and providing more room to maneuver in the face of economic shocks.
Fonte: G1
